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HYBRID MISMATCH.COM:  NEUTRALIZING THE 
TAX EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
 
by 
 
 
Maria S. Domingo* 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION   
 
 One reality is as certain as taxes:  when people—even 
accountants—think of taxes, dating is not the first topic to come 
to mind.  Oddly enough, though, what follows closely resembles 
today’s online dating phenomenon (at least as closely as tax ever 
could).   
 
What began as personals or personal ads, first printed in 
local newspapers, have evolved into global online dating 
services, which are now commonly used by individuals who are 
looking to find their “perfect match.”  These services provide 
subscription dating products around the world through websites 
and mobile applications that help individuals in their quest to 
find and develop a meaningful connection.1  Online dating 
includes search and matching features that enable users to search 
profiles, receive algorithmic matches and may use location-
based technology—the mix of these features is “constantly 
subject to iteration and evolution” in response to “competitors’ 
offerings, user requirements, social trends and the technological 
landscape.”2  In the digital world, online dating, akin to a present 
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day matchmaker, has yielded favorable outcomes for many of 
its users and produced lucrative business results.3   
 
 Much like individuals looking to find their “perfect 
match,” multinational enterprises (MNEs) have found 
connections in the tax laws of various jurisdictions to develop 
the perfect mismatch in their cross-border transactions, which 
until recently has produced favorable outcomes for MNEs and 
lucrative tax savings.  Consistent with the premise that 
“opposites attract,” hybrid mismatch arrangements use the 
differences in the tax treatment of financial instruments, entities 
or transfers to create favorable asymmetrical tax effects between 
countries that are part of the same transaction.  The mismatch 
can result in a deduction with no corresponding income 
inclusion or even a double deduction that erodes the MNEs’ tax 
bases in the applicable jurisdictions and substantially reduces 
their aggregate tax burden.  In a globalized world, governments 
need to consider how different tax regimes interact with each 
other in cross-border activities and the overall tax effect of these 
transactions.  As part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, the United 
States has codified key provisions (in line with the OECD’s Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Plan) meant to shut down the effects 
of hybrid mismatch arrangements.  However, different tax 
jurisdictions have divergent interests and reason follows that 
each country’s goal is to protect its tax revenue.   Absent global 
minimum standards, how long before taxpayers evolve with 
another iteration of tax strategies that work around anti-hybrid 
recommendations in perhaps more amenable locales or 
jurisdictions?   
 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows:  Part II 
provides background regarding the U.S. worldwide tax system 
(prior to Pub. L. 115-97) compared to the territorial tax system.  
Parts III and IV provide an overview of hybrid mismatch 
arrangements and discuss tax policy issues.  Part V navigates 
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through the key provisions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act that 
directly impact hybrid mismatch arrangements and discusses 
proposals for reform.  Lastly, Part VI concludes. 
 
II. TAX REGIMES 
 
Background – U.S. Tax System 
 
U.S. international transactions are generally divided into 
two broad categories for tax purposes:  outbound transactions 
and inbound transactions.  Outbound transactions involve U.S. 
citizens and residents (including domestic corporations created 
or organized in the U.S.) doing business and/or investing abroad; 
as inbound transactions involve foreign taxpayers (nonresident 
aliens and foreign corporations) doing business and/or investing 
in the U.S.  
 
Outbound Transactions: 
 
From a U.S. tax perspective, “outbound” pertains to U.S. 
persons, i.e., individuals or entities with foreign source income 
and/or that engage in activities outside of the U.S.  Prior to the 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (“TCJA”),4 the U.S. imposed a 
“worldwide” tax system (or residence-based system) in which 
domestic corporations were subject to U.S. tax on a worldwide 
basis.  In general, domestic corporations were subject to U.S. 
income tax on all income irrespective of whether the corporation 
derived income from a U.S. source5 or a foreign source.  The 
U.S. imposed entity-level taxation on a C corporation’s taxable 
income at statutory federal income tax rates of up to 35%.  To 
ameliorate the potential for double taxation that may result from 
U.S. taxes imposed on a domestic corporation’s foreign source 
income, the domestic corporation could claim a foreign tax 
credit for income taxes already paid to foreign countries, subject 
to certain limitations.6     
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A domestic parent corporation was subject to U.S. tax 
when its foreign corporate subsidiaries (which conduct foreign 
operations) repatriated their earnings as dividend distributions to 
the U.S. parent corporation.  As a result, the U.S. tax on such 
income was generally deferred until the foreign subsidiary 
repatriated the income—that is, U.S. multinationals could defer 
U.S. tax indefinitely on their foreign subsidiaries’ active income 
until the foreign subsidiary repatriated the income as a dividend 
to the U.S. parent corporation.7  Under Subpart F8 prior to its 
amendment under TCJA and the passive foreign investment 
company9 provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (anti-
deferral tax provisions), the domestic parent corporation was 
subject to immediate U.S. tax only on certain items that its 
foreign subsidiaries earned as passive income (e.g., interest, 
dividends, annuities, rents and royalties) or highly mobile 
income regardless of whether the foreign subsidiaries distributed 
the income as a dividend to their U.S. parent corporation.  The 
Subpart F provisions, in essence, treated certain passive income 
of a controlled foreign corporation as a deemed dividend to its 
U.S. parent subject to immediate U.S. taxation (i.e., no deferral 
until repatriation). 
 
Simply put, a U.S. multinational company was subject to 
U.S. tax on its worldwide income reduced by foreign tax credits 
and active foreign profits (e.g., foreign subsidiary’s earnings) 
only upon repatriation to a U.S. parent.  As a result, 
multinational enterprises (“MNEs”) implemented tax strategies 
to shift profits from the U.S.10 to no-tax or low-tax jurisdictions. 
 
Inbound Transactions: 
 
From a U.S. tax perspective, “inbound” pertains to non-
U.S. persons, i.e., individuals and entities with U.S. income 
and/or that engage in U.S. activities—including, for example, a 
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foreign corporation with U.S. source income and/or U.S. 
activities.  Prior to the TCJA, foreign corporations were subject 
to U.S. tax only on income with sufficient nexus to the U.S., i.e., 
income “effectively connected” with the conduct of a trade or 
business in the U.S.  In other words, the U.S. taxes a foreign 
corporation’s income generated within U.S. borders.  
“Effectively connected income” generally requires that the 
taxpayer have a physical presence or use assets in the U.S., and 
such income is taxed the same as income of a U.S. corporation 
(e.g., same tax rates).  However, tax treaties between the U.S. 
and the applicable foreign country may cap the amount of U.S. 
tax on a foreign subsidiary’s income.11  Moreover, foreign 
corporations are still generally subject to a U.S. withholding tax 
of 30% on interest, dividends, rents, royalties and certain types 
of income from U.S. sources, which a treaty may also decrease 
or eliminate.   
 
Territorial Tax 
 
Many other countries have adopted the “territorial” tax 
system (or source-based tax system), in which a country taxes 
an MNE’s income sourced only within its borders, i.e., income 
earned within the country’s tax jurisdiction.  Foreign source 
income (i.e., income generated outside of the country’s borders) 
is not subject to tax by the corporation’s country of residence 
under this system.  Therefore, the territorial tax system generally 
exempts from taxation the distributions of controlled foreign 
subsidiaries.  As such, it is important for countries that have 
implemented a territorial tax regime to determine accurately the 
source of a multinational’s revenues and expenses.  Pursuant to 
the participation exemption,12 the U.S. has recently made strides 
toward a territorial tax system via a 100% dividends-received 
deduction on certain foreign source income distributed to U.S. 
corporate shareholders.     
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III.    HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS 
 
 In recent years, governments have become increasingly 
alarmed by MNEs’ use of aggressive tax planning in their cross-
border transactions.13   The practical reality is that a 
multinational corporate group functions more akin to a single 
undivided organization rather than separate individual 
organizations—that is, the parent corporation may strategically 
coordinate its direct or indirect control of subsidiaries and/or 
affiliates to reduce overall taxes of the group and thereby 
increase profitability as a whole.14  Revenue authorities and tax 
policy makers have expressed concerns about the difficulty of 
taxing MNEs engaged in cross-border activities (e.g., lack of 
transparency, increased level of complexity and sophistication 
in structuring cross-border transactions) and a rise in BEPS.15  
The different tax regimes of multiple jurisdictions have resulted 
in asymmetrical tax effects between countries that are part of the 
same transaction.  This asymmetry, in turn, enables taxpayers to 
engage in base erosion and profit shifting.16  Therefore, it is 
imperative in a globalized world for governments to consider 
how different tax regimes interact with each other in cross-
border activities and the overall tax effect of these transactions.17   
 
In an effort to neutralize aggressive tax planning, the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(“OECD”)18 and G2019 countries have adopted a 15 Action Item 
plan to address BEPS.  In 2015, the OECD issued final reports 
on the 15 Action Items, which aim to ensure that profits are taxed 
in the jurisdiction where the MNEs performed the economic 
activities that produced such profits and where value was 
created.20  Interestingly, the OECD’s recommendations require 
that one country (to determine its own tax treatment) take into 
consideration the taxpayer’s position and tax treatment in 
another country.  This view is generally alien to legislators in 
most jurisdictions whose primary concern is to protect their own 
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country’s tax base.  In particular, Action 2 provides 
recommendations for domestic law and tax treaty provisions to 
neutralize the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements.  In a 
surprise move, the U.S. has more recently enacted legislation 
that adopts a number of the OECD’s recommendations.  But are 
these recommendations enough to curtail these arrangements? 
 
What are hybrid mismatch arrangements? 
 
Hybrid mismatch arrangements are cross-border 
transactions that exploit the differences in the tax treatment of 
financial instruments, entities or transfers between two or more 
tax regimes.  These arrangements both comply with the tax laws 
of the applicable jurisdictions and yet, use the very same laws to 
erode the tax bases in these countries.  Oftentimes to the benefit 
of the taxpayer (and detriment of revenue authorities), these 
arrangements may result in “double non-taxation” or tax 
deferral.   Hybrid mismatch arrangements can substantially 
reduce the aggregate tax burden of MNEs that are engaged in 
these transactions.21  The structured arrangements generally use 
hybrid financial instruments, hybrid transfers, and/or hybrid 
entities to achieve (1) a deduction with no corresponding income 
inclusion (“D/NI”), (2) a double deduction (“DD”), (3) an 
indirect D/NI or (4) foreign tax credits.   
 
Specifically, D/NI arrangements create a deduction in 
the payer jurisdiction (e.g., interest expense, which erodes the 
MNE’s tax base in that country) without a corresponding 
inclusion in the payee’s ordinary income by a second country 
that is involved in the same transaction.  Simply put, a 
multinational group deducts a payment under the tax system of 
the payer jurisdiction without a requisite inclusion in the payee’s 
ordinary income.  In DD arrangements, the MNE claims an 
income tax deduction for the same contractual obligation in two 
different jurisdictions—that is, multiple deductions are claimed 
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for a single expense.  Foreign tax credit generator arrangements 
enable MNEs to generate foreign tax credits that would 
otherwise be unavailable (e.g., generate multiple foreign tax 
credits for one amount of foreign tax paid).   Indirect D/NI 
arrangements involve payments that are deductible in the payer 
jurisdiction, which the payee then offsets against a deduction 
under a hybrid mismatch arrangement.  Accordingly, hybrid 
mismatch arrangements reduce the taxpayer’s collective tax 
base resulting in significant overall tax savings.22   
 
Cross-border conflicts in the characterization of a 
payment between multiple jurisdictions can result in tax 
mismatches of sorts.  The OECD’s recommendations are 
“linking rules” intended to align one tax jurisdiction’s treatment 
of a hybrid financial instrument or hybrid entity with the tax 
consequences in the counterparty jurisdiction to the transaction.  
The rationale behind the recommendations is to “ensure 
matching of income and deductions across international 
boundaries.”23  The OECD divides the recommendations into a 
primary response and secondary/defensive rule where the 
defensive rule is administered only if the other jurisdiction lacks 
a hybrid mismatch rule or the jurisdiction does not apply the rule 
to the arrangement.24  The rules focus on the payments and 
whether the characterization of the payment results in a 
deduction for the payer and income recognition for the payee.  
In general, the primary rule provides that the payer jurisdiction 
deny the taxpayer’s deduction for a payment if the payment is 
excluded from payee’s (recipient) taxable income in the 
counterparty jurisdiction or the counterparty jurisdiction also 
permits a deduction for the same payment.  If the payer’s 
jurisdiction does not apply the primary rule, then the 
counterparty jurisdiction may apply the defensive rule, which 
requires the payee to include the amount as income or deny the 
duplicate deduction.25  In order for these rules to apply, a hybrid 
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element must bring about the mismatch in tax outcomes in the 
first place. 
 
The OECD’s approach is to provide recommendations 
upon which each country can legislate domestically in a 
consistent and coherent manner with other jurisdictions.  The 
following discusses simplified examples26 of hybrid mismatch 
arrangements to illustrate their overall tax effect along with the 
OECD’s recommendations for domestic law to counteract these 
transactions.   
 
Hybrid Financial Instruments: 
 
Hybrid financial instruments are instruments that two or 
more countries involved in the same transaction treat differently 
for tax purposes because of a conflict in the tax jurisdictions’ 
characterizations of the instrument.  For example, the instrument 
is considered debt in one jurisdiction and equity in another 
jurisdiction.  In other words, the jurisdictions differ in their tax 
treatment of the same payment, which the taxpayer makes under 
the instrument.  In the following example, an MNE uses a hybrid 
financial instrument to achieve a favorable D/NI result.   
 
Example 1:27 A Co., a resident of Country A, owns 
100% of B Co., a resident of Country B.  Country A’s domestic 
law exempts dividends paid by a foreign company if its 
shareholder held greater than 10% of the company’s shares in 
the 12-month period before the foreign company pays the 
dividend.   Country A has no law in place that denies the 
dividend exemption in the payee jurisdiction (Country A) for 
payments that are deducted in the payer’s jurisdiction (Country 
B).  In other words, Country A has no law in place that denies A 
Co. the dividend exemption in Country A for payments that B 
Co. deducts in Country B.  B Co. borrows money from A Co. 
via a hybrid financial instrument.  The terms of the loan require 
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a market interest rate payable every six months in arrears.  B 
Co.’s interest and principal payments under the loan are 
subordinated to B Co.’s creditors and B Co. can defer the 
payments if it does not meet certain solvency requirements.   It 
is important to consider the characterization of the instrument 
and tax treatment of the payments thereto under the domestic 
law of each party’s jurisdiction.   
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
Country A and Country B Perspectives:  Country B 
treats the instrument as debt and permits the payer, B Co., to 
deduct the interest payments.  Meanwhile Country A treats the 
instrument as equity and exempts the payment as a dividend 
under its domestic laws.  Accordingly, A Co. is not subject to 
tax on receipt of the payment.  Therefore, the transaction results 
in a D/NI outcome. 
 
 OECD’s Recommendations:  The OECD’s 
recommendations are intended to align the treatment of an 
MNE’s cross-border payments via a hybrid financial instrument 
such that if the payer’s jurisdiction treats the payment as an 
expense then the payee’s jurisdiction recognizes the payment as 
ordinary income.28  As the primary recommendation, Country B 
A Co. 
Country A 
 
B Co. 
Country B 
 
Payment Hybrid Financial 
Instrument 
No income  
inclusion 
Deduction 
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should deny B Co. the deduction to the extent the transaction 
causes a D/NI outcome, i.e., B Co.’s interest payment is denied 
to the extent A Co. excludes the amount from its income under 
Country A’s laws.  As the defensive rule, if Country B does not 
apply the primary response, then Country A should require A 
Co. to include the payment in ordinary income.   
 
Example 1.1:29  Interestingly, the OECD’s final report 
includes an example using the territorial system.  The facts are 
the same as Example 1 above except that Country A follows a 
territorial tax regime and, therefore, taxes only domestically 
sourced income.  Furthermore, B Co. has no permanent 
establishment in Country A.  A Co. treats the interest income 
from B Co. (a non-resident) as foreign source income, which is 
exempt from tax in Country A.     
 
Country A and Country B Perspectives:   Under the 
domestic laws of Country A, A Co. excludes the interest from 
its income and, thus, is not subject to tax on the interest income.  
B Co. may deduct the interest payment under the domestic laws 
of Country B.  Therefore, the transaction results in a D/NI 
outcome. 
 
OECD’s Recommendation:  Although the transaction 
results in a D/NI outcome, the mismatch is not derived from the 
terms of the financial instrument itself but rather the territorial 
tax regime of Country A—that is, A Co. is exempt from tax on 
any foreign source income.  The parties could not change the 
terms of the instrument in any way that would make the interest 
payments taxable in Country A.  Thus, the hybrid financial 
instrument rule applies only if the mismatch results from the 
terms of the financial instrument itself. 
 
In contrast, in Example 1, Country A (payee jurisdiction) 
exempts only dividend income.  Country A’s tax exemption of 
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the dividends in Example 1 is attributable to both the source of 
the payments and the terms of the financial instrument.  
Therefore, the transaction results in a hybrid mismatch.     
 
Hybrid Entities: 
 
Hybrid entities are entities that one country considers 
non-transparent or opaque for tax purposes while another 
country treats the same entity as a transparent flow-through or 
disregarded entity.  For example, one country may treat an entity 
as a C corporation (that is taxed as a separate legal entity) and 
another country treats the same entity as a partnership (whose 
partners are generally taxed on their share of the partnership’s 
income subject to certain exceptions).  In the following example, 
an MNE uses a hybrid entity to achieve a favorable DD result.   
 
Example 2:30  A Co., an entity resident of Country A, 
owns 100% of B Co., a foreign subsidiary in Country B.  B Co. 
is a hybrid entity—that is, B Co. is treated as a disregarded entity 
under the laws of Country A and a separate legal entity under 
the laws of Country B for tax purposes.  B Co. borrows money 
from a local bank and pays interest on the loan. 
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Country A and Country B Perspectives:  Country B 
views B Co. as a separate legal entity, and, therefore, gives rise 
to an interest deduction in Country B.  Meanwhile, A Country 
disregards B Co. and treats A Co. as the borrower of the loan 
permitting A Co. to deduct the interest payment in Country A as 
well.  As a result, the taxpayer achieves a double deduction (i.e., 
Country A deduction and Country B deduction) for the same 
interest payment. 
OECD’s Recommendations:  The OECD recommends a 
“linking rule” that aligns the tax results in the payer jurisdiction 
(Country B) with the parent jurisdiction (Country A).31  The 
OECD’s primary recommendation is for the parent jurisdiction 
(Country A) to deny the duplicate deduction to the extent the 
payment gives rise to a DD outcome.  As the defensive rule, if 
the parent jurisdiction (Country A) does not apply the primary 
response, then the OECD recommends the payer jurisdiction 
A Co. 
Country A 
 
Loan 
Deduction 
B Co. 
Country B Deduction 
Country A 
 
Bank 
Country C 
 
B Co. 
Cou try B 
Payment 
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(Country B) deny the deduction to the extent the payment gives 
rise to a DD outcome.  The defensive rule applies only if the 
parties to the mismatch are in the same control group or 
structured arrangement in which the taxpayer is party to that 
structured arrangement.  Moreover, no mismatch arises to the 
extent the deduction offsets dual inclusion income. 32    
 
Imported Mismatch Arrangements: 
 
After a taxpayer engages in a hybrid mismatch 
arrangement between two countries, the taxpayer may shift or 
import the tax benefit of that offshore hybrid mismatch into a 
third country via a financial instrument (e.g., an ordinary loan).33  
Imported mismatch arrangements rely on the void of effective 
hybrid mismatch rules in offshore jurisdictions to achieve the 
mismatch in tax results, which the taxpayer can then import into 
the payer jurisdiction.  In the following example, an MNE uses 
an imported mismatch arrangement to achieve a favorable D/NI 
result.   
  
 Example 3:34  A Co., an entity resident of Country A, 
owns 100% of B Co., an entity resident of Country B.  A Co.’s 
business is to lend money to medium-sized enterprises.  In a 
back-to-back financing arrangement, A Co. lends money to B 
Co. via a hybrid financial instrument, and B Co. then lends the 
same money to C Co., an entity resident of Country C.  C Co. is 
sufficiently involved in the arrangement’s design to understand 
its mechanics and anticipated tax results.  Country A treats the 
hybrid financial instrument as equity and exempts the interest 
payment from B Co. as a dividend under its domestic laws.  
Country B treats the hybrid financial instrument as debt (to A 
Co.) and has not implemented hybrid mismatch rules under its 
domestic laws.  C Co.’s financial instrument in Country C is an 
ordinary loan (from B Co.).   
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Country A, Country B, and Country C Perspectives:  
Country A exempts the interest payment from B Co. to A Co. 
from tax under Country A’s domestic law, while B Co. deducts 
its interest payment to A Co. on its Country B tax return under 
Country B’s laws.  C Co. deducts its interest payment to B Co. 
on its Country C tax return under Country C’s laws, while B Co. 
includes the receipt of the interest on its Country B tax return.  
As a result of this structure, the taxpayer achieves a favorable 
indirect D/NI outcome between Country A and Country C.  In 
Country B, B Co.’s interest payment to A Co. should offset the 
interest income from C Co. 
 
B Co. 
Country B 
 
Income Deduction 
A Co. 
Country A 
 
Borrower Co. 
Country C 
 
Hybrid Financial 
Instrument 
No income 
inclusion 
Deduction 
Payment 
Loan 
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OECD’s Recommendations:  The OECD recommends a 
“linking rule” as its primary recommendation, which requires 
the payer jurisdiction to deny the deduction for the payment to 
the extent the payment generates an indirect D/NI tax result.  In 
other words, the payer jurisdiction (Country C) should deny a 
deduction for payment to the extent the payee (B Co.) treats such 
payment as an offset against a hybrid deduction (B Co.’s interest 
payment to A Co.) in the payee jurisdiction (Country B).35  Thus, 
if the primary response is implemented, then C Co.’s deduction 
is disallowed, B Co.’s receipt of interest income from C Co. is 
offset against B Co.’s interest payment to A Co., and A Co. 
recognizes no income on the interest received from B Co.  There 
is no defensive rule for the imported mismatch arrangement.   
 
Branch Mismatch Structures: 
 
A mismatch can occur when one entity makes a 
deductible payment to a branch and the taxpayer’s residence 
jurisdiction treats the payment as income received by its foreign 
branch, and, therefore, exempt from income tax under domestic 
law.  Likewise, the branch’s jurisdiction disregards the branch, 
and, thus, does not subject the income to tax.  In other words, 
neither the residence jurisdiction nor the branch jurisdiction 
includes the payment in ordinary income.  In the following 
example, an MNE uses a disregarded branch structure to achieve 
a favorable D/NI result. 
 
Example 4:36  A Co., an entity resident of Country A, 
has a branch in Country B (B Branch).  A Co. lends money to C 
Co., a related company of A Co. and an entity resident of 
Country C, through B Branch.  C Co. pays interest to B Branch 
on the loan. 
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Country A, Country B, and Country C Perspectives:    C 
Co. deducts the interest payment under Country C’s domestic 
laws.  A Co. excludes the interest payment because the payment 
is attributable to a foreign branch (B Branch) under Country A’s 
domestic laws.  Moreover, Country B does not tax the interest 
income because A Co. does not have sufficient presence in 
Country B under that jurisdiction’s domestic laws.  Therefore, 
the structure gives rise to an intra-group mismatch that achieves 
a D/NI outcome. 
 
OECD’s Recommendations:  The OECD recommends 
for a disregarded branch structure that the payer jurisdiction 
(Country C) deny C Co.’s deduction for a payment that gives 
rise to a D/NI outcome to the extent that the mismatch is a result 
of a payment to a disregarded branch (B Branch).  Therefore, C 
Co. cannot deduct its interest payment to B Branch.37 
 
A Co. 
Country A 
 
C Co. 
Country C 
 
Payment 
Loan 
Deduction B Branch 
Country B 
 
No income 
inclusion 
No income 
inclusion 
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IV.  TAX POLICY   
 
 Hybrid mismatch arrangements raise several policy 
concerns that can impact tax revenue, competition, fairness, 
economic efficiency and transparency.38  Although taxpayers 
incur initial costs for advice and implementation of hybrid 
mismatch arrangements, these arrangements can lead to 
significant tax savings—that is, MNEs have the potential to 
reduce the overall tax burden for the parties involved.  
Consequently, the tax authorities are unable to collect as much 
tax revenue and collectively lose revenue in the process.  The 
tax advantages that these structures create may also provide 
MNEs with a competitive advantage in comparison to small or 
mid-sized companies, which cannot easily expend the cost for 
tax advice nor implement mismatch arrangements.39  MNEs may 
have access to tax planning experts or strategies (which reduce 
their tax liabilities) but are cost prohibitive to smaller businesses, 
which some argue is inherently unfair.40   
 
 Hybrid mismatch arrangements can affect economic 
efficiency, i.e., investors may find cross-border investment more 
attractive in locales conducive to hybrid mismatches than an 
equal domestic investment. 41  Furthermore, hybrid mismatch 
arrangements may add to financial instability by increases in 
tax-favored leveraging or borrowing and a rise in risk-taking 
because investments that were uneconomic before tax may 
become practicable after tax.  These tax-driven arrangements 
may also affect transparency if the public does not fully grasp 
the underlying cause of a taxpayer’s low effective tax rate.42   
 
 The tax policy behind the BEPS project centers on the 
single tax principle, which provides that all income should be 
taxed only once.43  Specifically, the tax rate that applies depends 
on whether the income is passive or active, i.e., passive income 
should be taxed at the residence country tax rate and active 
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income at the average source country tax rate.  Thus, the single 
tax principle requires the removal of not only double taxation, 
but double non-taxation as well (e.g., D/NI, DD transactions).44  
Commentators have remarked that OECD’s Action 2 solutions 
are “soft recommendations” rather than global minimum 
standards.45  Consequently, the length of time for countries to 
converge and adopt these recommendations is unclear and may 
result in non-coordination and inconsistency.  Although a 
number of countries have displayed their intent to legislatively 
integrate the OECD’s recommendations, other countries may 
not act as deftly (or if at all) in this regard.46  The divergent 
interests of different tax jurisdictions and unilateral action by 
some countries to protect tax revenue have made it difficult to 
establish a cohesive set of rules.47    
 
To further complicate matters, each country must have a 
working knowledge of the tax treatment of the hybrid 
arrangements in other jurisdictions to apply the 
recommendations.48  Without cooperation and transparency 
from the taxpayers themselves to apply these rules under the 
applicable domestic law of affected countries, government 
agencies may find it difficult to recognize and determine the tax 
effects of a hybrid mismatch arrangement (much less enforce the 
rules under local law).  Moreover, taxpayers may find it 
appealing to restructure or replace existing hybrid mismatch 
arrangements with other planning opportunities that achieve the 
same D/NI or DD outcome but are beyond the reach of Action 
2’s linking rules, e.g., income exempt from tax under a pure 
territorial regime.  Because each country can determine its own 
domestic laws, countries may continue to vary in their treatment 
of financial instruments (e.g., debt versus equity) or hybrid 
entities (e.g., transparent or separate taxable entity).49  Yet, even 
worse, countries may engage in a “race to the bottom” that 
compromises the neutralizing effects of Action 2’s 
recommendations in some tax jurisdictions.50   
2019 / Hybrid Mismatch / 20 
 
 
 Despite these challenges, the OECD has reported some 
progress in this area.  In particular, the OECD states:  
 
Although not a minimum standard, Action 2 has 
been rapidly adopted by a number of members of 
the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework.  EU 
Member States adopted hybrid and branch 
mismatch rules in Council Directive (EU) 2017 
(“ATAD 2”) and hybrid mismatch rules were 
also included as part of the US tax reform 
legislation, which passed into law at the end of 
last year.51 
 
V.  U.S. TAX IMPLICATIONS – THE EFFECTS OF THE 
TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT  
 
 The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act has been touted as the most 
significant U.S. tax reform since the Tax Reform Act of 1986.   
As part of the recent tax overhaul, TCJA codified sweeping 
changes that impact international tax—specifically, tax 
provisions meant to deter and combat base erosion and profit 
shifting.   TCJA’s international tax provisions directly address 
the factors under prior law (i.e., high corporate tax rate, 
worldwide tax regime, deferral of overseas profits) that provided 
incentives for MNEs to engage in tax arbitrage.  The TCJA 
reduced the corporate tax rate and added or modified provisions 
to limit interest expense deductions, tax unrepatriated earnings, 
move towards a territorial tax system, and impose a base erosion 
and anti-abuse tax (“BEAT”).  The following discusses key 
provisions of TCJA that directly impact and may have been 
implemented to defeat (or at least deter) the effect of hybrid 
mismatch structures. 
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Corporate Tax Rate 
 
Prior to TCJA, corporations were subject to a graduated 
tax rate structure and the top corporate tax rate was generally 35 
percent on taxable income in excess of $10 million.  Effective 
for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2017, TCJA 
provides a flat corporate tax rate of 21 percent.52  Although the 
21% U.S. corporate tax rate is significantly lower than the prior 
tax of 35%, this rate still exceeds the corporate tax rates of 
competing jurisdictions such as Ireland’s 12.5% tax rate and the 
United Kingdom’s 19% tax rate.53  Arguably, other countries 
may respond to the U.S. in kind by competitively reducing their 
tax rates below the current U.S. corporate tax rate of 21%.54      
 
Deemed Repatriation of Accumulated Post-1986 Deferred 
Foreign Income 
 
The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated for 2015 that 
U.S. companies accumulated approximately $2.6 trillion of 
undistributed and previously untaxed foreign earnings 
offshore.55  Under prior law, U.S. multinational companies could 
defer taxation on unrepatriated foreign earnings and profits 
generally declared as “permanently reinvested” abroad for 
financial statement purposes.  TCJA imposes a one-time tax on 
these foreign earnings through the mechanism of deemed 
repatriation, which subjects previously untaxed foreign earnings 
to immediate taxation under the Subpart F rules.56  As the U.S. 
moves towards a quasi-territorial tax system, the deemed 
repatriation tax is in essence a transition tax on previously 
unrepatriated foreign earnings.  To ensure that all distributions 
from foreign subsidiaries are treated in the same manner under 
the quasi-territorial tax system (participation exemption 
system),57 unrepatriated earnings must be taxed as if the earnings 
are repatriated subject to a reduced tax rate.  The provision is 
effective for the last tax year of a foreign corporation that begins 
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before January 1, 2018, and with respect to U.S. shareholders, 
for the tax years in which or with which such foreign 
corporations’ tax years end.   
 
In general, the repatriation tax applies not only to 
controlled foreign corporations, but also foreign corporations in 
which a U.S. person owns a 10-percent voting interest.58  A U.S. 
shareholder is required to include its pro rata share of certain 
foreign subsidiaries’ post-1986 accumulated deferred foreign 
earnings and profits.59  Pursuant to I.R.C. Section 965, the 
foreign corporation’s Subpart F income is increased by the 
greater of accumulated post-1986 deferred foreign earnings 
determined as of November 9, 2017 or December 31, 201760 and 
the U.S. shareholder must include this amount in its gross 
income.61  The inclusion, however, is reduced by the U.S. 
shareholder’s pro rata share of deficits from certain foreign 
subsidiaries.62  Moreover, the U.S. shareholder may deduct a 
portion of the income inclusion in a manner such that the 
deduction results in a reduced tax rate on the inclusion of 
previously untaxed foreign earnings.63   The amount of the 
deduction depends on whether the deferred earnings are held in 
cash or other assets—that is, the U.S. shareholder may deduct 
from the inclusion the amount necessary to obtain a 15.5 percent 
effective tax rate on deferred foreign earnings held in cash (or 
cash equivalents) and an 8 percent effective tax rate on all other 
earnings (i.e., illiquid assets).64  Furthermore, the U.S. 
shareholder may offset the tax with foreign tax credits subject to 
limitations, i.e., foreign tax credits are limited to the taxable 
portion of the inclusion.65  The domestic corporation generally 
may elect to pay the tax liability over an eight-year period.66    
 
Lastly, if a U.S. shareholder expatriates67 within 10 years 
of TCJA’s enactment on December 22, 2017 (i.e., 12/22/27), 
then the formerly domestic corporation is subject to recapture of 
the deduction.68  Indeed, the expatriated entity69 is denied any 
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deduction on the inclusion and the entire inclusion is taxed at 35 
percent.   
 
Interest Expense Limitation 
 
Earnings stripping occurs when a corporation pays 
interest to a related party and the related party is not (or is only 
minimally) subject to U.S. tax on the corresponding interest 
income.  Effective for tax years beginning after December 31, 
2017, TCJA modified the earnings stripping provision under 
I.R.C. Section 163(j) by limiting the business interest deduction 
to the sum of the following for the taxable year:70  (1) business 
interest income,71 (2) 30 percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted 
taxable income (“ATI”) but not below zero, and (3) the 
taxpayer’s floor plan financing interest.72  ATI is defined as 
taxable income calculated without the following:  (1) any item 
of income, gain, deduction or loss that is not properly allocable 
to a trade or business; (2) any business interest expense or 
business interest income; (3) any net operating loss deduction; 
(4) deductions for qualified business income under I.R.C. § 
199A; and (5) for taxable years beginning before January 1, 
2022, any deduction allowable for depreciation, amortization or 
depletion.73  In other words, ATI is approximately equal to 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization for 
tax years after December 31, 2017 and before January 1, 2022.  
For tax years after December 31, 2021, ATI then approximately 
equals earnings before interest and taxes.  Furthermore, the 
taxpayer may carryforward any disallowed business interest 
deductions indefinitely subject to certain restrictions.74   
 
Example 5:  For the taxable year ended December 31, 
2018, A Corporation has business interest income of $1,000, 
ATI of $20,000 and no floor plan financing interest.  A 
Corporation pays $10,000 of business interest expense.  A 
Corporation’s deduction for business interest is limited to 
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$7,000 [$1,000 + (30% x $20,000)] and the remaining $3,000 of 
disallowed interest is carried forward indefinitely. 
 
Pursuant to an exception for small businesses, taxpayers 
with average annual gross receipts for the three-taxable-year 
period ending with the prior taxable year that do not exceed $25 
million are exempt from the interest expense limitation.75  
Moreover, I.R.C. Section 163(j) does not apply to regulated 
public utilities, certain real estate industries (by taxpayer’s 
election), electric cooperatives, the trade or business of 
performing services as an employee and farming businesses (by 
taxpayer’s election).76 
 
Participation Exemption System (a Quasi-territorial Tax 
System) 
 
As discussed in Part II, countries that follow a territorial 
tax system impose tax only on income that is sourced within the 
specific country’s borders.  TCJA includes provisions that move 
the U.S. from a worldwide tax system toward a quasi-territorial 
tax regime under I.R.C. Section 245A.  Effective for 
distributions made after December 31, 2017, a U.S. corporation 
that owns at least 10% stock of foreign corporations77 may 
deduct 100 percent of the foreign-source portion of the 
dividends that it receives from these foreign corporations.78    
Notably, this provision does not apply to non-corporate U.S. 
shareholders (e.g., individuals).  Furthermore, this dividend 
deduction applies only to income of foreign corporations and not 
to income of branches.  I.R.C. Section 245A effectively exempts 
certain foreign source income through this 100-percent 
dividends-received deduction (“DRD”) even if there is no 
withholding tax on the dividend at source and the foreign 
subsidiary paid the dividend from earnings that were not subject 
to foreign tax in its country of incorporation.   The foreign-
source portion of the dividend is the amount that bears the same 
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ratio to the dividend as the undistributed foreign earnings79 bears 
to the foreign corporation’s80 total undistributed earnings and 
profits.81  Furthermore, the Internal Revenue Code disallows a 
foreign tax credit or deduction for paid or accrued taxes 
attributable to the portion of a distribution that qualifies for the 
DRD.82   
 
To qualify for the DRD, the U.S. corporation must 
satisfy a holding period requirement, i.e., the domestic 
corporation must hold the stock of the specified 10%-owned 
foreign corporation for more than 365 days during the 731-day 
period beginning on the date that is 365 days before the date on 
which the share becomes ex-dividend with respect to the 
dividend.83  In essence, the U.S. has eliminated U.S. tax on 
repatriated foreign earnings in an effort to disincentivize U.S. 
multinationals from keeping their earnings offshore.   
 
Hybrid Dividends: 
 
I.R.C. Section 245A squarely addresses hybrid mismatch 
arrangements, which take advantage of the different tax 
treatments under U.S. and foreign laws of certain payments (e.g., 
hybrid financial instrument, hybrid entities) that produce D/NI 
or DD outcomes.84  The purpose of the provision is to deter the 
benefits of such tax arbitrage and it follows generally (but does 
not codify all) the OECD’s Action 2 recommendations for 
hybrid financial instruments.85  In accordance with the single tax 
principle, a U.S. shareholder is disallowed from claiming the 
100-percent DRD for any dividend from a controlled foreign 
corporation (“CFC”) that is a hybrid dividend.86   
 
As illustrated in the examples in Part III, a hybrid 
dividend results when a CFC distributes a dividend to a U.S. 
shareholder and both the foreign corporation and the U.S. 
shareholder can deduct the dividend under each entity’s 
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respective tax jurisdictions—that is, the foreign corporation 
(payor) may claim a deduction (or other tax benefit) for the 
dividend in its country and the U.S. shareholder (payee) may 
also deduct the dividend in the U.S. under the general rule of 
I.R.C. Section 245A.87   The U.S. shareholder, however, is 
denied the DRD, and thus, the double deduction that taxpayers 
may otherwise claim is prevented.88  Moreover, if a controlled 
foreign corporation distributes a hybrid dividend to another 
recipient-controlled foreign corporation, then the latter treats the 
hybrid dividend as Subpart F income.  Accordingly, its U.S. 
shareholder must include the shareholder’s pro rata share in 
gross income.89  Lastly, the U.S. shareholder cannot claim 
foreign tax credits or deductions for any taxes paid or accrued 
with respect to the hybrid dividend.90  Under these 
circumstances, the provision effectively blocks the U.S. 
shareholder (payee) from the benefits of a tax-free repatriation 
of foreign income. 
 
Base Erosion Anti-avoidance Tax 
Cross-border Payments between Affiliated Companies: 
 
In an effort to target base erosion and profit shifting, 
I.R.C. Section 59A (as added by TCJA) provides the base 
erosion anti-avoidance tax (“BEAT”).  These provisions are 
meant to deter base erosion via deductible cross-border 
payments between affiliated companies (i.e., foreign parents or 
controlled foreign corporations).91  Simply put, BEAT’s purpose 
is to deter earnings stripping transactions, which multinational 
entities have used to shift profits to lower tax jurisdictions 
through intercompany transfers.  BEAT appears to take 
particular aim at U.S. subsidiaries of foreign parents that shift 
profits outside of the U.S. through outbound payments.   
 
In essence, BEAT is an alternative minimum tax, which 
an MNE must pay if it reduces its regular U.S. tax liability below 
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the applicable percentage of its modified taxable income for this 
purpose.  BEAT applies to U.S.-owned and foreign-owned 
multinational corporations and casts its net on payments to 
foreign parents and foreign subsidiaries.92  Consistent with the 
single tax principle, if the income is not subject to tax at 
residence, then BEAT imposes tax at the source of the income.93 
 
Effective for base erosion payments paid or accrued in 
taxable years beginning after December 31, 2017, a taxpayer 
must pay a “base erosion minimum tax”94 if (1) the taxpayer is 
a corporation (other than a regulated investment company, a real 
estate investment trust, or an S corporation) with average annual 
gross receipts of at least $500 million for the three-year taxable 
year period ending with the preceding tax year and (2) the 
corporation’s base erosion percentage for the tax year is 3 
percent95 or greater.96  The base erosion percentage is 
determined by dividing the taxpayer’s aggregate base erosion 
tax benefits (generally, any deduction from certain base erosion 
payments to a foreign related party)97 by the taxpayer’s 
aggregate deductions allowed [tax-deductible expenses], taking 
into account base erosion tax benefits subject to certain 
exceptions.98   A base erosion payment is (1) any deductible 
amount that a taxpayer paid or accrued to a foreign related 
party99 (e.g., interest payment to foreign parent, royalty payment 
to foreign subsidiary), (2) paid or accrued to a foreign related 
party to acquire property that is subject to depreciation or 
amortization, (3) certain reinsurance payments to a foreign 
related party, or (4) certain payments with respect to a surrogate 
foreign corporation or related foreign persons that results in a 
reduction of the taxpayer’s gross receipts.100  Therefore, BEAT 
may significantly impact companies that depend on cross-border 
transactions (e.g., professional service, banks, insurance 
companies).   
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 The tax is equal to the excess of the applicable rate (5% 
for taxable year beginning in 2018, 10% for tax year beginning 
in 2019 through 2025, and 12.5% for tax year beginning after 
December 31, 2025)101 of the taxpayer’s modified taxable 
income over its regular tax liability reduced by certain tax credits 
(but not below zero).102  For this purpose, the modified taxable 
income is generally equal to taxable income without any base 
erosion tax benefit or base erosion percentage from a net 
operating loss deduction.103  In other words, the taxpayer adds 
back to its taxable income any base erosion tax benefit and base 
erosion percentage from a net operating loss deduction.  The 
taxpayer must compare taxes calculated under BEAT to its 
regular tax liability and, consequently, pay the higher levy.  
Notably, BEAT applies only to payments made to related 
parties, and thus, taxpayers may avoid BEAT altogether by 
transacting with customers or unrelated distributors.104     
 
Hybrid Transactions or Hybrid Entities: 
 
As discussed in Part III, a hybrid transaction is any 
transaction, series of transactions, agreement, or instrument 
where the payer’s tax jurisdiction treats the payment(s) as 
deductible interest or royalties (e.g., U.S. federal income tax) 
while the payee recipient’s jurisdiction does not.  The difference 
in treatment between the jurisdictions results in a D/NI 
(deduction with no corresponding income inclusion) or DD 
(double deduction) mismatch to the taxpayer’s benefit.  A hybrid 
entity is considered fiscally transparent (e.g., partnership) for 
U.S. federal income tax purposes while another tax jurisdiction 
considers the same entity as non-transparent or opaque (e.g., C 
corporation) for tax purposes.  In contrast, a reverse hybrid entity 
is considered non-transparent or opaque for U.S. tax purposes 
while another tax jurisdiction considers the same entity fiscally 
transparent.    
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Consistent with the OECD’s BEPS Action 2 initiative 
and the single tax principle, I.R.C. Section 267A denies a 
deduction for payments to a related party pursuant to a hybrid 
transaction or hybrid entity if (1) there is no corresponding 
inclusion to the related party under its tax jurisdiction (D/NI) or 
(2) the related party is also allowed a deduction under its tax 
jurisdiction (DD).  I.R.C. Section 267A is effective for tax years 
beginning after December 31, 2017.      
 
Proposals for Reform 
 
 Practitioners and commentators have raised their 
concerns about the recent legislation, and in particular, technical 
and policy issues of the provisions involving hybrid 
arrangements.  Overall, the consensus appears to be that the U.S. 
is moving in the right direction toward international tax reform, 
but there is still much work left to be done.  The following 
discusses key issues and proposals for reform (through 
legislation or regulation) debated by commentators. 
 
Deemed Repatriation Tax: 
 
 Deemed repatriation rules under I.R.C. Section 965 
impose an immediate tax on previously untaxed foreign earnings 
at rates of 15.5% on cash and cash equivalents (i.e., liquid assets) 
held abroad and 8% on all other unrepatriated earnings (i.e., 
illiquid assets).  Commentators have expressed a number of 
concerns about the technical aspects of this provision.  First, 
cash equivalent as defined for this purpose appears overly broad.  
The definition of cash includes financial instruments, e.g., 
options contracts, futures contracts and bona-fide hedging 
transactions, that if held overseas are subject to a tax rate of 
15.5% under these rules.105  Commentators have argued that this 
treatment could be over-inclusive because some of these 
financial instruments may be illiquid or may have a non-tax 
2019 / Hybrid Mismatch / 30 
 
avoidance business purpose.106   The Secretary is authorized to 
issue regulations or other guidance that may be necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of I.R.C. Section 965.107  
Accordingly, Treasury should provide regulatory guidance that 
clarifies the term cash and cash equivalents for this purpose.         
 
 Second, downward attribution rules (meant to limit 
corporate inversions) apply under I.R.C. Section 965 for 
purposes of determining the U.S. ownership of a foreign 
corporation.  In other words, stock owned by a foreign 
corporation is attributed to a U.S. person for purposes of 
establishing a controlled foreign corporation.  As a result, the 
amount of taxpayers defined as a U.S. shareholder in a CFC may 
increase and cause a higher inclusion of income subject to the 
deemed repatriation tax.108  To prevent this over inclusion, 
Congress should consider limiting the downward attribution 
rules only to corporations.109 
 
 Third, the deemed repatriation tax is calculated using the 
higher measured base of two testing dates, i.e., November 2, 
2017 and December 31, 2017.  Commentators have raised a 
potential loophole related to the testing dates for taxpayers with 
fiscal year ends (rather than calendar year ends).  Taxpayers with 
fiscal year ends (e.g., 6/30, 9/30) could potentially avoid 
additional cash accumulations (subject to the deemed 
repatriation tax) by distributing any increase as dividends.110  To 
address this potential loophole, Treasury should provide 
guidance that considers the facts and circumstances of a 
taxpayer’s cash movements and investments.111 
 
 Lastly, if history repeats itself, MNEs during the 2004 
tax holiday used repatriated earnings to distribute dividends to 
or buyback stock from their shareholders rather than create new 
jobs nor invest in capital spending or expansion.112  Although 
MNEs repatriated offshore earnings because of the transition 
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tax, a significant amount of the repatriated earnings was invested 
in stock buybacks.113 
 
Interest Expense Limitation: 
 
 The interest expense limitation is directed at MNEs that 
use interest expense deductions to strip earnings out of higher-
tax jurisdictions.  Commentators have raised concerns over 
various methods taxpayers could use to avoid the limitation.  For 
example, financial institutions with positive net interest can 
lease assets and deduct the rental payments on those leases.114  
Taxpayers could also opt to incur debt outside of the U.S. or to 
issue preferred equity.115   The House and Senate bills included 
a provision specifically directed at profit shifting by restricting 
the U.S. entity’s share of debt based on its income or assets; 
however, the provision was removed from the final legislation.  
To prevent taxpayers from circumventing the interest expense 
limitation, Congress should consider using a worldwide interest 
allocation that allows a U.S. company to deduct only its 
allocable share of interest expense based on its share of 
worldwide income.116    
 
BEAT : 
 
The primary purpose of BEAT is to deter earnings 
stripping transactions, which MNEs have used to shift profits to 
lower tax jurisdictions through intercompany payments between 
affiliated companies.  Although BEAT appears to strengthen 
U.S. taxation of inbound transactions, commentators have 
argued over a number of issues that may impact the intended 
effect of the tax.  First, commentators have asserted that the $500 
million revenue threshold that triggers BEAT is too high, i.e., 
the amount is 10 times the threshold under I.R.C. Section 385 
directed at earnings stripping.  Because of the high threshold, 
many MNEs below this threshold that engage in profit shifting 
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transactions (otherwise subject to BEAT) are able to avoid the 
tax.117   Moreover, BEAT does not apply unless the base erosion 
payments are above the specified threshold, which is generally 
3%.    
 
Both thresholds create a “cliff effect” and may encourage 
MNEs to plan their structures or transactions in a manner such 
that they fall right below the required thresholds to escape BEAT 
entirely—that is, $499 million in average annual gross receipts 
and/or a base erosion percentage of 2.99%.118  Nonetheless, even 
when BEAT does apply, the nominal tax rate of 10% appears 
hardly sufficient to deter profit shifting.119  To address these 
issues, Congress should consider the following:  significantly 
reduce BEAT’s $500 million revenue threshold and add an asset 
test similar to the thresholds under I.R.C Section 385’s earnings 
stripping regulations; remove the base erosion percentage 
threshold of 3% altogether; and increase the BEAT rate of 10% 
to a tax rate that would more likely deter profit shifting.  Perhaps 
Congress should simply restrict BEAT to outbound payments 
made to no or low tax jurisdictions.120  
 
Second, base erosion payments, as defined, generally 
exclude payments for cost of goods sold (except for inverted 
corporations after November 9, 2017).  As a result, taxpayers 
could exploit planning opportunities that avoid BEAT altogether 
such as capitalizing royalty payments into cost of goods sold, 
embedding foreign intellectual property into a product’s cost of 
goods sold, or restructuring the supply chain.121  For example, a 
U.S. subsidiary pays a foreign parent for tangible property and 
includes the goods in its inventory for sale.  The U.S. subsidiary 
also pays a royalty to the foreign parent for the trademark or 
distribution rights of these goods.  Because the royalty payments 
are capitalized as part of cost of goods sold, the U.S. subsidiary 
is able to elude BEAT on these royalty payments.122  To prevent 
this loophole, commentators have suggested that base erosion 
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payments include payments for goods, but the taxpayer should 
be permitted to claim a cost component deduction (which would 
address the royalty payments concern).123  However, there is no 
clear answer to this issue because a tax on cross-border sales of 
inventory could prove problematic with the World Trade 
Organization and, consequently, result in trade and treaty 
issues.124        
 
 Third, certain services with no mark-up (i.e., services 
using the service cost method) are excluded from base erosion 
payments.  Commentators and practitioners disagree over the 
treatment of the cost component of services with a markup—that 
is, some argue that any service with a markup is included for 
BEAT purposes in total while others argue that only the markup 
is included.125  Proposed Treasury Regulations clarify whether 
taxpayers may exclude any portion of the services with a markup 
from BEAT—that is, taxpayers may use the service cost method 
exception if there is a markup, but the portion of any payment 
that exceeds the total cost of services (the markup component) 
is ineligible for this exception and consequently a base erosion 
payment.126   
 
 Fourth, BEAT does not provide a credit for foreign taxes 
and, therefore, may function more as a tax on foreign source 
income rather than serve its intended purpose to limit profit 
shifting.  For example, a multinational with substantial foreign 
source income from high tax jurisdictions makes the minimum 
base erosion payments subject to BEAT.  Because there is no 
foreign tax credit for BEAT, it acts as a tax on foreign source 
income in this scenario instead of serving its intended purpose, 
which is to restrict the effects of profit shifting.127  Accordingly, 
Congress should consider allowing a foreign tax credit for 
BEAT.128 
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 Fifth, commentators expressed various other concerns 
including whether taxpayers must aggregate individual 
payments for BEAT purposes (e.g., if interest payments are 
assessed at a gross or net basis); BEAT is over-inclusive in 
certain circumstances (e.g., applies to ordinary transactions, 
nonabusive commercial transactions, and securities lending); 
BEAT may penalize routine lending transactions between 
groups; and BEAT may impact intragroup interest payments 
made by regulated financial intermediaries (e.g., banks, 
securities dealers).129   To address these concerns, Congress 
should reconsider using a worldwide allocation of interest that 
allows a U.S. company to deduct only its allocable share of 
interest expense based on its share of worldwide income or 
assets.130 
 
 Finally, because the anti-hybrid provisions limit interest 
and royalty payments between related parties, MNEs may find 
ways to deduct other types of payments to create D/NI or DD 
outcomes.131  In addition, a number of issues remain unresolved 
in this area, e.g., the treatment of conduit arrangements and 
multiple country arrangements, which may impact the 
effectiveness of the anti-hybrid provisions.132  Treasury should 
provide guidance that addresses these remaining concerns.   
 
 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION  
 
MNEs have used hybrid mismatch arrangements to 
produce favorable tax outcomes (D/NI or DD) that erode its tax 
bases in applicable jurisdictions through double non-taxation or 
tax deferral resulting in significant tax savings.   In 2015, the 
OECD issued its final reports on the 15 Action Items included 
in its Base Erosion Profit Shifting Plan—specifically, Action 2 
provides recommendations under domestic law to neutralize the 
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effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements.  In an effort to defeat 
these transactions, the U.S. has codified key provisions in recent 
legislation that generally follow the OECD’s recommendations 
and directly address in TCJA’s anti-hybrid provisions the impact 
of hybrid mismatch arrangements.   However, multilateral 
efforts are needed to deter hybrid mismatch arrangements and 
coherently dismantle the benefits of base erosion and profit 
shifting.  Moreover, there is a risk that TCJA’s recent provisions 
may be changed in the future, and as in any match, only time 
will tell if these provisions produce the results intended or if 
these transactions continue off the BEATen path as the “perfect 
mismatch.” 
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